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Article from GigaOm.

“Two Silicon Valley-backed Bay Area companies appear to be the tech vendors behind Apple’s new sizable and pioneering clean power push at its massive data center in North Carolina. Last week it was revealed that solar panel maker SunPower will provide Apple with panels for a 20 MW solar farm, while I reported earlier this month that fuel cell maker Bloom Energy looks to be the vendor behind Apple’s 5 MW fuel cell farm. The significance of Apple opting to partner with two Valley-born clean power firms illustrates that the greentech venture ecosystem can work — it just takes quite a long time.

San Jose, Calif.-based solar panel maker SunPower was founded way back in the mid-80′s by Stanford electrical engineering professor Richard Swanson, and received early funds from the Department of Energy, the Electric Power Research Institute, two venture capital firms and chip firm Cypress Semiconductor. The company went public in the Spring of 2005, bought venture-backed Berkeley, Calif.-based solar installer Powerlight in late 2006, and more recently was bought by oil giant Total.

Sunnyvale, Calif-based fuel cell maker Bloom Energy was founded a decade ago, though only came out of stealth two years ago, and was venture capital firm Kleiner Perkin’s first foray into greentech. Bloom also counts venture firm NEA as an investor, and Bloom raised its latest $150 million round of funding in late 2011.

Both companies have taken years to develop into firms that can mass produce their respective clean power technologies at scale and at a low enough cost to meet the needs of a large customer like Apple. And both companies have likely taken longer to mature than their investors had originally hoped. Kleiner Partner John Doerr said a couple years ago that he thought Bloom Energy would take nine years to go public (which, if true, would mean Bloom would have gone public last year). SunPower’s execs reportedly said back in the early(ish) days of the company that developing SunPower into a solar manufacturer took a lot longer than they anticipated.

But Apple apparently chose these two Bay Area clean power leaders for its first-of-its-kind, huge solar and clean power farms, suggesting these firms are delivering industry-leading products at the right economics for Apple. Apple is spending $1 billion on the data center, and likely between $70 million to $100 million on the solar farm. Each 100 kW Bloom fuel cell costs between $700,000 to $800,000 (before subsidies), so Apple’s fuel cell farm could cost around $35 million.

Yes, both SunPower and Bloom Energy, have had their fare share of struggles in recent years. 2011 was a particularly difficult year for SunPower, with a glut of solar panels causing prices to fall around 50 percent globally and Total’s CEO said recently that SunPower would have gone bankrupt last year without Total’s backing. Bloom Energy is a private company and doesn’t disclose its financials, but likely if Bloom was in shape to go public in 2011, it would have done so.

However, it’s no secret that greentech has been a particularly hard area for venture capitalists to invest in. The long time tables, the large capital needed, the hardcore science for the innovations, and the low cost focused energy markets, have created a difficult ecosystem for the traditional VC to make money off of. But after a long slog — which is still ongoing for SunPower and Bloom Energy in 2012 — these clean power technologies have actually broken into the mainstream. Valley, backed cleantech firms can make it — you’ve just got to sit back and wait.”

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The Advantages of a “Date-Certain” Mergers and Acquisition Process Over a “Standard Mergers and Acquisitions Process”
Every venture capital investor hopes that all of his investments will succeed. The reality is that a large percentage of all venture investments must be shut down. In extreme cases, such a shut down will take the form of a formal bankruptcy or an assignment for the benefit of creditors. In most cases, however, the investment falls into the category of “living dead”, i.e. companies that are not complete failures but that are not self-sustaining and whose prospects do not justify continued investment. Almost never do investors shut down such a “living dead” company quickly.

Most hope against hope that things will change. Once reality sets in, most investors hire an investment banker to sell such a company through a standard mergers and acquisition process – seldom with good results. Often, such a process requires some four to six months, burns up all the remaining cash in the company and leads to a formal bankruptcy or assignment for the benefit of creditors. In many instances, there are a complete lack of bidders, despite the existence of real value in the company being sold.

The first reason for this sad result is a fundamental misunderstanding of buyer psychology. In general, buyers act quickly and pay the highest price only when forced to by competitive pressure. The highest probability buyers are those who are already familiar with the company being sold, i.e. competitors, existing investors, customers and vendors. Such buyers either already know of the company’s weakness or quickly understand it as soon as they see the seller¥s financials. Once the sales process starts, the seller is very much a wasting asset both financially and organizationally. Potential buyers quickly divide the company’s burn rate into its existing cash balance to see how much time it has left. Employees, customers and vendors grow nervous and begin to disengage. Unless compelled to act, potential buyers simply draw out the process and either submit a low-ball offer when the company is out of cash or try to pick up key employees and customers at no cost when the company shuts down.

The second reason for this sad result is a misunderstanding of the psychology and methods of investment bankers. Most investment bankers do best at selling “hot” companies, i.e. where the company’s value is perceived by buyers to be increasing quickly over time and where there are multiple bidders. They tend to be most motivated and work hardest in such situations because the transaction sizes (i.e. commissions) tend to be large, because the publicity brings in more assignments and because such situations are more simply more fun. They also tend to be most effective in maximizing value in such situations, as they are good at using time to their advantage, pitting multiple buyers against each other and setting very high expectations. In a situation where “time is not your friend”, the actions of a standard investment banker frequently make a bad situation far worse. First, since transaction sizes tend to be much smaller, an investment banker will assign his “B” team to the deal and will only have such team spend enough time on the deal to see if it can be closed easily. Second, playing out the process works against the seller. Third, trying to pit multiple buyers against each other and setting unrealistically high valuation expectations tends to drive away potential buyers, who often know far more about the real situation of the seller than does the investment banker.

“Date Certain” M&A Process

The solution in a situation where “time is not your friend” is a “date-certain” mergers and acquisitions process. With a date-certain M&A process, the company’s board of directors hires a crisis management/ private investment banking firm (“advisor”) to wind down business operations in an orderly fashion and maximize value of the IP and tangible assets. The advisor works with the board and corporate management to:

1. Focus on the control, preservation and forecasting of CASH;
2. Develop a strategy/action plan and presentation to maximize value of the assets. Including drafting sales materials, preparing information due diligence war-room, assembling a list of all possible interested buyers for the IP and assets of the company and identifying and retaining key employees on a go-forward basis;
3. Stabilize and provide leadership, motivation and morale to all employees;
4. Communicate with the Board of Directors, senior management, senior lender, creditors, vendors and all stakeholders in interest.

 
The company’s attorney prepares very simple “as is, where is” asset-sale documents. (“as is, where is- no reps or warranties” agreements is very important as the board of directors, officers and investors typically do not want any additional exposure on the deal). The advisor then contacts and follows-up systematically with all potentially interested parties (to include customers, competitors, strategic partners, vendors and a proprietary distribution list of equity investors) and coordinates their interactions with company personnel, including arranging on-site visits. Typical terms for a date certain M&A asset sale include no representations and warranties, a sales date typically two to four weeks from the point that sale materials are ready for distribution (based on available CASH), a significant cash deposit in the $100,000 range to bid and a strong preference for cash consideration and the ability to close the deal in 7 business days.

Date certain M&A terms can be varied to suit needs unique to a given situation or corporation. For example, the board of directors may choose not to accept any bid or to allow parties to re-bid if there are multiple competitive bids and/or to accept an early bid. The typical workflow timeline, from hiring an advisor to transaction close and receipt of consideration is four to six weeks, although such timing may be extended if circumstances warrant. Once the consideration is received, the restructuring/insolvency attorney then distributes the consideration to creditors and shareholders (if there is sufficient consideration to satisfy creditors) and takes all necessary steps to wind down the remaining corporate shell, typically with the CFO, including issuing W-2 and 1099 forms, filing final tax returns, shutting down a 401K program and dissolving the corporation etc.

The advantages of this approach include the following:

Speed – The entire process for a date certain M&A process can be concluded in 3 to 6 weeks. Creditors and investors receive their money quickly. The negative public relations impact on investors and board members of a drawn-out process is eliminated. If circumstances require, this timeline can be reduced to as little as two weeks, although a highly abbreviated response time will often impact the final value received during the asset auction.

Reduced Cash Requirements – Given the date certain M&A process compressed turnaround time, there is a significantly reduced requirement for investors to provide cash to support the company during such a process.

Value Maximized – A company in wind-down mode is a rapidly depreciating asset, with management, technical team, customer and creditor relations increasingly strained by fear, uncertainty and doubt. A quick process minimizes this strain and preserves enterprise value. In addition, the fact that an auction will occur on a specified date usually brings all truly interested and qualified parties to the table and quickly flushes out the tire-kickers. In our experience, this process tends to maximize the final value received.

Cost – Advisor fees consist of a retainer plus 10% or an agreed percentage of the sale proceeds. Legal fees are also minimized by the extremely simple deal terms. Fees, therefore, do not consume the entire value received for corporate assets.

Control – At all times, the board of directors retains complete control over the process. For example, the board of directors can modify the auction terms or even discontinue the auction at any point, thus preserving all options for as long as possible.

Public Relations – As the sale process is private, there is no public disclosure. Once closed, the transaction can be portrayed as a sale of the company with all sales terms kept confidential. Thus, for investors, the company can be listed in their portfolio as sold, not as having gone out of business.

Clean Exit – Once the auction is closed and the consideration is received and distributed, the advisor takes all remaining steps to effect an orderly shut-down of the remaining corporate entity. To this end the insolvency counsel then takes the lead on all orderly shutdown items.

About Gerbsman Partners

Gerbsman Partners focuses on maximizing enterprise value for stakeholders and shareholders in under-performing, under-capitalized and under-valued companies and their Intellectual Property. Since 2001, Gerbsman Partners has been involved in maximizing value for 69 Technology, Life Science and Medical Device companies and their Intellectual Property, through its proprietary “Date Certain M&A Process” and has restructured/terminated over $800 million of real estate executory contracts and equipment lease/sub-debt obligations. Since inception, Gerbsman Partners has been involved in over $2.3 billion of financings, restructurings and M&A transactions.

Gerbsman Partners has offices and strategic alliances in Boston, New York, Washington, DC, Alexandria, VA, San Francisco, Orange County, Europe and Israel. For additional information please visit http://www.gerbsmanpartners.com or Gerbsman Partners blog.

GERBSMAN PARTNERS
Email: steve@gerbsmanpartners.com
Web: http://www.gerbsmanpartners.com
BLOG of Intellectual Capital: blog.gerbsmanpartners.com
Skype: thegerbs

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Article from GigaOm.

Don’t get mad at me for not finding seven stories for you to read this weekend. I have been busy with some other stuff and as a result I have not been able to spend as much time reading as I normally do. Regardless, here is an abbreviated recommendation list. Hope you enjoy them.

Read more here.

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Article from GigaOm.

For many years, Oracle and HP co-existed quite happily. They collaborated on the first Exadata in 2008, for example. Former HP CEOs Carly Fiorina, then Mark Hurd, keynoted at Oracle OpenWorld. HP appeared to have supplanted Sun Microsystems as Oracle’s hardware BFF for a while. Everything was copacetic.

Now the two companies are arch-rivals and are engaged in an increasingly bitter, seemingly personal battle, the latest skirmish of which saw a California Superior Court judge throw out a fraud claim Oracle lodged against HP. He also opened up court documents that don’t show either company in a particularly good light.

How did it all go so bad?

First, Oracle bought Sun for $7.4 billion in a deal completed in January 2010. That meant Oracle, for the first time was in the hardware business and its servers would compete with HP servers. That sealed the fate of the relationship going forward.

The public bad feeling erupted in August 2010 when HP canned Hurd as CEO, then hired former Oracle president Ray Lane (pictured above right) as chairman and Leo Apotheker, former CEO of SAP, as CEO. SAP is a huge rival to Oracle in enterprise apps and Lane left Oracle after a bumping heads with Oracle chairman Larry Ellison (pictured at right.) Things have just deteriorated ever since.

Here are some highlights (low lights) of the slap fight.

In a letter to the New York Times in August 2010, Ellison said HP’s firing of Hurd:

The H.P. board just made the worst personnel decision since the idiots on the Apple board fired Steve Jobs many years ago … That decision nearly destroyed Apple and would have if Steve hadn’t come back and saved them.”

HP’s server and storage chief Dave Donatelli blasted Oracle for discontinuing Itanium development at the HP partner conference in March 2010. Donatelli asked the couple thousand HP resellers in attendance to lobby Oracle to reverse it’s Itanium decision.
This is a shameless attempt to force customers to spend a lot of money to move to a platform over time that gives customers no benefits  … Oracle made this decision to slow Sun SPARC market losses.

Ray Lane calls out Hurd in his letter to The New York Times in October, 2010.

The bottom line is: Mr. Hurd violated the trust of the Board by repeatedly lying to them in the course of an investigation into his conduct. He violated numerous elements of HP’s Standards of Business Conduct and he demonstrated a serious lack of integrity and judgment
ut now in California District Court is just the latest in a  deterioration of a previously beneficial relationship between the two tech giants.

After Apotheker announced HP plans to buy Autonomy — another enterprise software company for $11.7 billion in August, Oracle couldn’t contain itself.

In a statement on September 28, 2011, Oracle said Autonomy had shopped itself to Oracle first and Oracle turned it down. When Autonomy CEO Mike Lynch denied that, Oracle said: “Either Mr. Lynch has a very poor memory or he’s lying.”

When there was further denial, Oracle put out another statement entitled “Another whopper from Autonomy CEO Mike Lynch” and helpfully published the PowerPoint slides it said he and banker Frank Quattrone brought to the meeting.  The presentation is here and here.

According to the statement:

Ably assisting Mike Lynch’s attempt to sell Autonomy to Oracle was Silicon Valley’s most famous shopper/seller of companies, the legendary investment banker Frank Quattrone.  After the sales pitch was over, Oracle refused to make an offer because Autonomy’s current market value of $6 billion was way too high.

The next chapter in this saga may be a trial on HP’s remaining claims against Oracle which should kick off in April, but stay tuned: anything can happen and usually does.”

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By Dan Shapiro.

“I just got the following email.

Subject: Small taxi company looking to expand

Hello,

I run a small taxi company outside of Boston Massachusetts. My community has been targeted for casino development and I am looking to expand my business. Could you possibly provide some advice on how to find venture capital?

For someone who lives in the startup world, this looks pretty silly.  But I’m sure I’d say a lot of silly things if I were getting in to the taxi business, too.  So I figured I’d point him to a simple explanation of why taxi companies (actually, services companies in general) aren’t appropriate for VC.  I did the Google thing for a bit to find a good article.  And no luck.

Well, you know what they say: when the internet fails you, make more internet.  Here, then, are a very good set of reasons not to take venture capital (or – why venture capital won’t take you).

1.  You want to build a profitable company

First day of Founder’s Institute I ask how many people want to raise venture capital.  Most of the hands go up.  I then ask who wants to build a profitable company.  Again, most hands go up.

The funny thing about this is – VCs don’t actually like their companies to be profitable.  Someday, sure, but not on their watch.  You see, profitability means that the company wont grow any faster.

This seems odd, but think about this for a minute. At the early stages, a company may be making money, but it’s almost certainly investing every penny it makes back in to the business.  If it has access to outside capital (e.g. a VCs), it’s investing more than it makes.  And that’s exactly what VCs like: companies that can grow at amazing speed, and never slow down their burn rate to amass cash.

They like this for two reasons.  First, VCs want to invest in companies that can grow explosively.  That means huge markets, executives who can scale up a business fast, and a willingness on the part of management to double down on a winning bet – over, and over, and over again.  Second, because it means the company keeps coming back to the VC for more money on positive terms.  That means the VC keeps getting to buy more and more of the growing concern.

Of course, this is something of an over-broad generalization.  I’m required to include one per post or I lose my startup blogging license.  In fact many venture backed companies are profitable, it’s very impressive to bootstrap your company to profitability in a few months before raising outside investment, etc.   But if you are excited about a profitable business that can cut you giant dividend checks (not that most VCs can even accept divided checks  – long story), realize that VCs will not be pleased with that approach to running the business.  They will want you to plow those earnings back in to the business.  And when the day comes that a VC-backed business generates cash faster than it can effectively spend it?  They sell the company, or IPO (which is technically also selling the company), or replace the CEO with someone who can spend faster.

A taxi business should be run for profits.  That’s not VC style.

2. Your business has reasonable margins

As a general rule, VCs don’t like reasonable margins.  They are exclusively interested in outrageous margins.  Ludicrous margins.  We’re talking about sneering at 50%, and hoping for 80%, 90%, crazy astronomy stuff.  Venture capital is all about investing a little bit of money to create a business with massive scale and huge multiples – investing tens of millions to build software that then can be duplicated or served up for virtually nothing extra per-person with a total market size of billions.

In particular, VCs don’t like businesses that are people-powered.  Software businesses are awesome, but their evil twin – software consultancies – are near-pariah to VCs.  If adding revenue means adding bodies, they don’t like it.  In fact, enterprise software companies, which can tread a fine line between software consulting & software development, sometimes get really creative to come down on the right side of the line.

So the rule of thumb is that VCs like product companies: software, drugs, cleantech, and so on.  And they don’t like the manufacturing, service industry, and consulting businesses that often are just a tiny shift of business model away.

Every new taxi requires a… well, a new taxi.  And a new taxi driver.  Not the right business for VC.

3. You are going to double your investors’ money

I’ve covered this before, but VCs really don’t want to double their money.  Strange though it sounds, their economics make that look like a failure.  They need to target a 10x return on their investment, and that means – depending on stage and fund size – that you company has to grow to somewhere in the hundreds-of-millions to billions range to be interesting.

That means taking your taxi business from $20MM in annual revenue to $40MM just doesn’t do it for them.  Particularly because the valuation multiples on the aforementioned lower-margin businesses are smaller.

4. VCs probably don’t want to invest in you

Here are the people VCs really love to invest in:

  • Entrepreneurs who’ve already made them lots of money
  • Their closest buddies
Here are the people who VCs can be convinced to invest in:
  • People who have been wildly successful at high-profile past jobs that are related to their new business  (e.g. a former executive VP at a Fortune 500 company, inventor of thingamajig that everyone knows)
  • New graduates from top-of-the-top tier schools who have built something amazingly cool already
  • Extremely charismatic type-A personalities
Anyone else is possible, but our taxi driver is going to have a devil of a time.

5. You have better things to do with 9 months, and you will probably fail

That’s how long it took me to do my Series A for Ontela.  9 months before the first check came in.  Average is 6-12.  That’s because a busy VC will look at a few companies a day, and will make a few investments a year.  The math says the hit rate is well under 1%.  That matches my experience – I pitched over 100 times during our Series A investment.  Not only that, but most of the companies pitching the same events and people that I saw worked just as hard as I did, and did not get funded.  And fundraising is a near-full time job; you won’t have much time for actually driving your taxi.

6. You will have a new boss

You know the great thing about working for yourself?  Well, if you raise VC, you probably don’t have that thing any more.  Raising VC usually means forming a board that includes your investors, and that board is charged with, among other things, potentially firing and replacing you.  I’ve worked with a number of boards and have been lucky in that they were all awesome and I would recommend those folks to anybody.  But if you like your freedom, then bringing on VC may feel somewhat familiar – in an “I have a boss again” way you probably won’t enjoy.

What are my alternatives?

VC is really only appropriate for a tiny fraction of a fraction of the companies in the US.  But there are numerous alternatives.
  • Angel investors are individual investors who can invest larger amounts, on more flexible terms, and with less onerous restrictions.  Many companies that take VC money actually start with angel investments – but lots of companies never do VC, and just grow off of angel investment.
  • Traditional bank loans are always an option if you have a sufficiently traditional company – while they may not be right for many purposes, they’re definitely the best terms you will find for bringing in capital.
  • A Revenue Loan from a company like Lighter Capital is a way for companies with revenue to bring in capital with a debt structure – without giving up control to outside investors.
  • And, of course, Bootstrapping is arguably the best way of all – re-investing your company’s profits in your own growth, and building a strong company based on the revenues from your business.

…So does this mean I shouldn’t raise VC?

Look.  I’ve raised over $30mm from 7 different firms in the course of my two startups.  I will tell you: if you are the right kind of company, and find the right kind of investor, then VC is awesome.  It’s an instant infusion of cash, connections, experience, credibility, and confidence at the stroke of a pen.  It accelerates everything.  It focuses the mind.  I can’t recommend it highly enough.
But most companies are not the right kind of companies.  And the only thing more frustrating and time consuming than raising a VC round is failing to raise a VC round.
So think hard.  Make sure it’s for you.  And if not – keep on driving!”
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